{"id":241099,"date":"2026-07-24T17:20:52","date_gmt":"2026-07-24T17:20:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/yogaesoteric.net\/?p=241099"},"modified":"2026-07-24T17:23:21","modified_gmt":"2026-07-24T17:23:21","slug":"the-praxian-genocide-kill-chain-part-4","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/yogaesoteric.net\/en\/the-praxian-genocide-kill-chain-part-4\/","title":{"rendered":"The Praxian Genocide Kill Chain \u2013 Part 4"},"content":{"rendered":"

Read the third part<\/a> of the article<\/p>\n

The fake AI technology race with China<\/strong><\/p>\n

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China’s DeepSeek V4<\/em> AI model was recently released globally as an open-source project. Developers worldwide can now use DeepSeek V4<\/em> at a fraction of the cost of its main US competitors \u2013 Google’s DeepMind<\/em>, OpenAI’s GPT-5.4<\/em>, and Anthropic’s Claude 4.5<\/em>.<\/p>\n

DeepSeek <\/em>AI is led by Chinese billionaire, startup venture capitalist, and founder Liang Wenfeng through his quantitative hedge fund and asset management company, High-Flyer. After some regulatory back and forth in China regarding quant funds \u2013 investments using AI and machine learning \u2013 High-Flyer posted impressive profits in 2025. These profits enabled Liang Wenfeng and his partners to invest more aggressively in DeepSeek<\/em>‘s research and development. While he is definitely not an accelerationist \u2013 a term of derogation in China \u2013 Liang says that he and his companies have become \u201cdisruptors by accident [\u2026….]<\/em>.\u201d He describes his aggressive startup investment strategy as \u201chardcore innovation<\/em>,\u201d which is apparently distinct from the accelerationism of the Praxians.<\/p>\n

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Deepseek founder Liang Wenfeng<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Prior to Beijing’s favourable regulatory shift for quantitative funds, DeepSeek<\/em> had been developed using US NVIDIA graphics processing units (GPUs).<\/p>\n

In 2023, Liang described how DeepSeek<\/em> had built up a stockpile of US-made GPUs to develop earlier versions of DeepSeek<\/em>. Tensions between the US and China reportedly escalated when the Praxians helped Trump secure his second term in the Oval Office in January 2025. Trump then ordered a ban on US-made NVIDIA chips being exported to China. However, DeepSeek<\/em> and other Chinese AI startups had an alternative source of chips.<\/p>\n

In May 2025, Trump signed a contract for the delivery of US AI chips, including NVIDIA processors, to the Digital Transformation Hub in Abu Dhabi. Trump described the contract as a \u201cUS-UAE partnership to accelerate AI<\/em>.\u201d China has reportedly now banned the import of the NVIDIA AI chips. However, China does not need to import processors from the US because the Digital Transformation Hub in Abu Dhabi has an agreement with the Trump administration for the delivery of the processors and serves as a \u201ccrucial base for Chinese AI companies<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

DeepSeek<\/em> has reportedly abandoned NVIDIA GPUs and developed V4 using Huawei Ascend GPUs manufactured in China. The world of AI development appears to be increasingly divided. US technology providers like NVIDIA are securing exclusive contracts with Western governments, while China is apparently building its own AI architecture based on domestic hardware and infrastructure.<\/p>\n

On the surface, this split seems to reinforce the Praxians’ core thesis that the US and China are engaged in a technological race \u2013 a new kind of Cold War \u2013 and that defeat in this race would pose an existential threat to America. This argument underlies the Praxians’ explanation to US voters that the US needs to pursue neo-reactionary accelerationism in order to survive. However, upon closer examination of this alleged \u201crace,\u201d none of it makes sense.<\/p>\n

US diplomats have accused DeepSeek<\/em> of engaging in so-called AI \u201cdistillation<\/em>\u201d \u2013 that is, using US AI models to train and develop its own. However, this is a baseless claim. Access to US and Chinese AI models is sold on the open market. Once purchased, anyone can use these AI models for any purpose. DeepSeek<\/em> has acknowledged that its development \u201cmay contain results<\/em>\u201d generated by using other available models. Furthermore, it is evident that the exchange of information between US and Chinese AI developers is reciprocal.<\/p>\n

In 2024, US AI companies reportedly attempted to block Chinese access to their models. However, this is not a practical approach when a company sells its AI models in open, global markets. Not only were Chinese developers \u2013 indeed, virtually anyone \u2013 easily circumvented the supposed restrictions, but the appearance of a blockade only reinforced China’s drive to develop its own \u2013 and significantly cheaper \u2013 AI alternatives. In reality, DeepSeek<\/em> would not have achieved its current status, and likely wouldn’t even exist, were it not for the ongoing technology transfer \u2013 by whatever means \u2013 that the Chinese company has received from US technology firms.<\/p>\n

If, as we are told, the West needs to win the supposed technological race, it is not unreasonable to ask when this race is supposed to begin. The so-called \u201crace\u201d has thus far been characterized more by cooperation than competition; and this cooperation continues.<\/p>\n

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US President Donald Trump (left) greets Chinese government officials together with SpaceX CEO Elon Musk (second from right) and Jensen Huang of NVIDIA (right) during Trump’s diplomatic trip to China in May 2026<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Consider this example: NVIDIA’s Blackwell<\/em> platform was designed to enable developers to run the \u201clong-context inference and agentic systems<\/em>\u201d that DeepSeek V4<\/em> now provides. NVIDIA seems thrilled. Tests with DeepSeek V4<\/em> \u201cout of the box<\/em>\u201d on NVIDIA GPUs have shown that \u2013 unsurprisingly \u2013 Chinese AI models can help US AI developers because they run flawlessly on US hardware using the US AI architecture.<\/p>\n

In fact, US AI agent developers are particularly enthusiastic about the introduction of DeepSeek V4<\/em>. They describe it as \u201cparticularly well suited for agents, [because] it features long context coordination, inferences and tool calls<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Lushbinary, an Indian-owned company operating from the US, \u201cdevelops production-ready AI agents based on DeepSeek V4, Claude, and GPT<\/em>.\u201d Because Anthropics\u2019 Claude AI<\/em> model code is fully compatible with DeepSeek V4<\/em>, US developers who want to \u201cdevelop AI agents with DeepSeek V4<\/em>\u201d can easily swap out the Claude<\/em> code.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, not only is there a noticeable lack of technological competition, but there are also hardly any signs of conflict within the transnational capital investment structures.<\/p>\n

In the previous parts of the article, we established that transnational capital is opaque \u2013 investment houses fiercely protect the identities of their investors \u2013 and that accelerationism functions like an investment shell game. Startup accelerators hand off startups to startup incubators, which then bring in larger venture capital (VC) firms if the startup shows promise. Solid growth typically leads to initial public offerings (IPOs), and the investment houses and asset managers consolidate their control. Nevertheless, we can identify the traces of transnational capitalist oligarchs like the Praxians by \u201cfollowing the money,\u201d to quote the modern maxim.<\/p>\n

Unravelling the shell game becomes somewhat more complex when venture capital is invested internationally. For example, the VC giant Sequoia Capital, allied with the Praxians, appeared to have divested its Chinese operations in 2023, when Sequoia China became HongShan Capital Group (HSG). However, the English translation of HongShan is tellingly \u201cRedwood<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Sequoia Capital told the Financial Times<\/em> (FT<\/em>) that it would \u201crun its China business as a completely independent entity from its US business<\/em>.\u201d If \u201crunning<\/em>\u201d a venture capital fund in another country while claiming the foreign branch is \u201ccompletely independent<\/em>\u201d sounds like a contradiction, that\u2019s because it is.<\/p>\n

If these reports are to be believed, there was apparently no rational economic reason for Sequoia to make its Chinese subsidiary \u201cindependent<\/em>.\u201d Pointing out that Sequoia China was the \u201cmost successful US-China investment alliance<\/em>\u201d and had generated \u201cprofits for the American parent company<\/em>\u201d by fostering \u201centire generations of Chinese tech companies<\/em>,\u201d Sequoia Capital executives explained that the \u201ccost-benefit ratio<\/em>\u201d had changed and was now negative. From a business perspective, this self-contradictory narrative is clearly nonsense. The decision to seemingly separate the venture capital activities was clearly politically motivated. You can\u2019t maintain the appearance of national animosity when the respective oligarchies are obviously working together as partners.<\/p>\n

Since then, the \u201crace\u201d narrative has only become more ludicrous. In December 2024, the \u201ccompletely independent<\/em>\u201d Chinese VC firm Shixiang, which had \u201cspun off from Sequoia China<\/em>,\u201d hosted a \u201cclosed<\/em>\u201d symposium for Chinese AI developers. DeepSeek<\/em> was reportedly a hot topic of conversation there.<\/p>\n

It turns out that Shixiang was founded in 2019, four years before Sequoia China gained \u201cindependence<\/em>\u201d, and that Shixiang\u2019s \u201ccore team is from Sequoia China<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

This meeting likely played some role in \u201crekindling\u201d US interest in AI development in China, although it remains unknown when it had ever waned.<\/p>\n

In June 2025, Joshua Kushner, the brother of Trump’s son-in-law and founder and managing partner of Thrive Capital (which received seed funding from Peter Thiel, among others), together with Capital Group, known as one of the world’s largest investment management firms, sent \u201cexecutives to China to find out more about the AI scene<\/em>,\u201d as reported by the South China Morning Post<\/em> \u2013 as if they didn’t already know everything about that scene.<\/p>\n

In December 2025, Meta, led by Thiel’s longtime business partner and fellow neo-reactionary accelerationist, Mark Zuckerberg, made a bizarre business announcement. Meta declared its intention to acquire the Chinese AI company Manus, touted as \u201cthe next DeepSeek<\/em>.\u201d It also announced that after the Manus acquisition, it would sever \u201cties<\/em>\u201d with China. The $2 billion takeover proceeded smoothly. Then, in April 2026, when it was already too late to influence the Manus deal, Beijing suddenly announced it would \u201ctighten control<\/em>\u201d over its AI industry and instructed companies to \u201crefuse American funding<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

US AI developers and the tech giants backed by Praxian are reportedly \u201cshocked<\/em>\u201d by the rapid development of Chinese AI, though it’s inexplicable why they should be \u201cshocked<\/em>.\u201d Partnerships between US and Chinese tech companies have been evident for decades and predate the \u201cnew Cold War<\/em>\u201d narrative we’re supposed to accept. The unidentifiable \u201crace\u201d is now being described as a \u201cneck-and-neck race<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

To put it bluntly: there is absolutely no sign of a \u201crace\u201d in the development of AI. Sure, everyone is \u201ccompeting\u201d to develop agentic AI, but what we are observing is international cooperation \u2013 not competition. This is particularly advantageous for the Praxians, as they are striving to establish the agentic state.<\/p>\n

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The Praxians have spread a story about existential threats and intense competition to justify US public spending (i.e., taxpayer money) on AI development, but that’s all: a story to help them achieve their goals.<\/p>\n

And in the age of hybrid warfare, these objectives extend to all \u201cdomains\u201d.<\/p>\n

China’s military-civilian fusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

In 2015, at the plenary session of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) delegation during the third session of the 12th National People’s Congress, China’s Supreme Leader Xi Jinping elevated the concept of military-civilian integration to a national strategy. The goal was to modernize and strengthen China’s military by merging commercial technological developments with military applications. This formalized national strategy is often referred to as China’s military-civilian fusion (MCF) policy.<\/p>\n

In addition to international collaborations, DeepSeek<\/em> has also grown internally, primarily due to the relaxed regulatory environment in China and the government subsidies the company receives because of its location in the Hangzhou Special Economic Zone \u2013 more precisely, the Hangzhou High-Tech Zone. DeepSeek also appears to be an important MCF company.<\/p>\n

DeepSeek<\/em> AI reportedly provides \u201creal-time autonomous reconnaissance and decision support<\/em>\u201d for the PLA’s fleet of new autonomous and remotely piloted vehicles based on the Norinco CS\/VP16B all-terrain vehicle (ATV). The PLA has combined DeepSeek<\/em>-controlled target acquisition systems with the Norinco ATV series to produce autonomous Lynx ATVs, which carry a range of weapon systems.<\/p>\n

Due to the privileges afforded by special economic zones and military combat zones (MCFs), Chinese companies, many of which are reportedly state-owned, completely dominate the global market for military drones. While the war in Ukraine continues to kill civilians on both sides, Chinese firms supply critical military technology and components to both Russian and Ukrainian manufacturers. When the Chinese public-private partnership holds trade shows in cities designated as special economic zones (SEZs), such as Shenzhen, it takes great care to keep \u201cenemies\u201d apart and ensure they are not embarrassed by public encounters. However, Chinese sales representatives apparently do not hesitate to exploit competition for components to drive up prices.<\/p>\n

Chinese companies are allegedly also supplying weapons technology to Iran. The US has repeatedly imposed sanctions on Iranian procurement programs in a public attempt to prevent the purchase of Chinese military equipment. The official position of the Chinese government is that it does not supply \u201cweapons\u201d or so-called \u201cdual-use\u201d technology \u2013 suitable for both civilian and military applications \u2013 to Iranian manufacturers. The striking similarity between Iranian and Chinese attack drones is described as merely an official \u201ccoincidence<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

In reality, China is taking public-private partnership to a new level, effectively merging much of its private sector’s technological innovation with its nominally public defence research and development. In doing so, it has revolutionized global arms markets and, indeed, the very nature of warfare. While multipolar proponents may hope for less war, China’s multi-community cooperation (MCC) approach reduces the economic costs of war and expands the kinetic domain of hybrid warfare. The MCF strategy diminishes the military advantage of nation-states by opening the global arms market to potentially more private-sector actors. We may all hope that a multipolar world will see fewer international conflicts, but there are indications that it could very well lead to a greater number of conflicts involving a wider range of actors.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the Chinese government’s MCF strategy renders Western sanctions largely irrelevant.<\/p>\n

This is because Chinese military technology is often developed as commercial \u201cnon-military\u201d technology through international public-private partnerships. The proliferation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China \u2013 deregulated innovation zones \u2013 has led to higher MCF productivity. This is seen as part of China\u2019s response to Western sanctions and trade tariffs. As a result, Western nations are reportedly lagging behind the leading BRICS countries in the technology race, both in civilian and military technology, including AI.<\/p>\n

But this is not the result of another series of mistakes by Western leaders. Rather, it is the continuation of a process.<\/p>\n

The theory that China’s remarkable technological and economic transformation since the 1970s arose in a vacuum and suddenly accelerated out of necessity \u2013 that is, in response to Western sanctions and trade tariffs \u2013 is an illusion. It is China’s long-standing public-private partnerships with Western companies and governments, not to mention the substantial Western direct investment the country has received over many decades, that have fuelled its economic and technological renaissance.<\/p>\n

Western-Chinese public-private partnerships have consistently facilitated the transfer of military and other sensitive commercial technologies from the West to China, often using Israel as an intermediary. For many years, the exchange of such technologies underpinned Israel’s diplomatic relations with China.<\/p>\n

For example, in 1979, the Israeli multi-billionaire Saul Eisenberg flew a delegation of Israeli arms companies to China to conclude military supply contracts with Chinese firms, precisely to foster cordial relations between Israel and China. The US government and its NATO allies maintained their defence cooperation with Israel, even though they knew full well that Israel was transferring defence and other \u201csensitive technologies<\/em>\u201d to China and Chinese companies.<\/p>\n

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As researcher, author, and independent journalist James Corbett pointed out, there is a reason China has developed an arsenal that bears a suspicious resemblance to the American model. Occasionally, when the transfer of sensitive technologies via Israel is uncovered, years of very serious investigations by committees ensue. Subsequently, Western news media eventually discuss the ceremonial chastisement of a designated scapegoat, supposedly blamed for what is clearly a long-standing but unwritten Western foreign trade policy.<\/p>\n

Making this observation does not mean denying the ingenuity or dedication of the Chinese. Regardless of the extent of support their nation received, no people could have transformed their economy as radically and rapidly as the Chinese without considerable shared knowledge, commitment, and dedication.<\/p>\n

Essentially, the Chinese government’s MCF\/SEZ strategy has provided China’s nominal \u201cenemies,\u201d particularly the governments of the US and Israel, with an extremely convenient pretext to pursue a more or less identical approach. The Israeli government, much like China, has merged its public defence research and development with its private technology sector. Silicon Wadi is full of companies founded by graduates of Unit 8200, whose workforce is largely drawn from the Israeli military and intelligence services. The Praxians’ companies have been deeply embedded in Israel’s public-private defence industry for many years. The Praxians have been enthusiastic supporters since the virtual founding of Israel’s \u201cStartup Nation<\/em>\u201d in 2009.<\/p>\n

The Israeli public-private defence partnership hides behind an opaque veil of legal identities belonging to private companies, attempting to obscure the relationships between the corporate world and Israel’s public-sector defence ministries and intelligence agencies. In 2018, the Israeli news agency Calcalist<\/em> described how the system works:<\/p>\n

\u201cSince 2012, development projects that were previously carried out internally by the Israeli military and intelligence services have been outsourced to external contractors who were already working for the Israeli Ministry of Defence. These private companies develop hardware and software solutions for Israeli defence organizations and also train relevant military and intelligence personnel. As private companies, they can contract with technology providers without being subject to the potential restrictions imposed on defence and state intelligence agencies. Most of the executives at these companies are veterans of Israeli military technology units.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Much like Israel, the US has used the same narrative of technological threat to ostensibly justify its own merging of public and private defence contractors. As journalist Whitney Webb has reported, the US National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) was primarily established to examine \u201chow the [US] government can work with industry to compete with China\u2019s concept of \u2018civil-military merging\u2019.<\/em>\u201d Chaired by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt and featuring prominent members such as Gilman Louie \u2013 the former head of the CIA\u2019s investment arm, In-Q-Tel \u2013 the NSCAI, which operated from 2019 to 2021, laid the groundwork for a US-developed MCF-like system. Examples of US MCF initiatives include the Defense Microelectronics Commons (DMC).<\/p>\n

The different terminology is important because it allows the US government to continue pretending to reject China’s MCF strategy, rather than viewing it as a model it has itself promoted and adopted. This deception is cleverly supported by US media outlets that quote experts claiming the US is aiming to \u201climit China’s technological development<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

However, a remarkable shift has recently been observed in the propaganda. The New York Times<\/em> reports on comments by Daniel R. Russell, a former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who is less than enthusiastic about the Trump administration’s current military adventure. In light of the administration’s recent actions in Venezuela and Iran, Russell was quoted as saying:<\/p>\n

\u201cDonald Trump may believe he is demonstrating military strength to intimidate Beijing. But his actions in Venezuela and Iran are more likely to encourage Beijing to strengthen its resilience against the US and deepen its rapprochement with Russia.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Criticism of US foreign policy is nothing new in the United States, but since September 11, 2001, the US media have consistently and largely uncritically supported US military operations abroad, as evidenced, for example, by their reporting on Iraq, Libya, and Syria. This unqualified support has suddenly vanished, and the US mainstream media have become far more critical.<\/p>\n

The groundwork laid by the NSCAI ultimately led to the CHIPS and Science Act<\/em> 2022 (CHIPSSA<\/em>). This legislation channelled U.S. taxpayer money into a system of grants and incentives to boost research and development in dual-use technology. For example, CHIPSSA<\/em> incentivized U.S. private-sector manufacturers to build a \u201cnetwork of semiconductor technologies for the defence industrial base<\/em>.\u201d As a result, the U.S. Department of War (then the Biden administration\u2019s Department of Defense) established the aforementioned DMC under CHIPSSA<\/em>. The DMC set up eight U.S. prototyping hubs. These hubs are tasked with optimizing \u201clab-to-fab connections<\/em>\u201d and \u201caccelerating microelectronic innovation driven by Department of Defense demand<\/em>.\u201d The goal is to develop a \u201ctalent pool<\/em>\u201d familiar with dual-use research and development to form the U.S. \u201cdomestic semiconductor workforce<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Building upon the concept of \u201cThe Microelectronics Commons<\/em>,\u201d established in the 2021 annual renewal of the National Defense Authorization Act<\/em> of 1961, the DMC enables the current Department of War (DoW) to \u201cutilize a potentially unlimited pool of new technology developers<\/em>.\u201d The MCF-like \u201cpipelines<\/em>\u201d for defence research and development are overseen by the U.S. National Security Technology Accelerator (NSTXL).<\/p>\n

The National Security Technology Project XL (NSTXL), launched in 2016 as a public-private partnership between the Department of Defense (DoD), academia, and entrepreneurs (investors), has since evolved to better leverage the Praxian accelerationist approach to defence procurement by specializing in Other Transaction Agreements (OTAs). Instead of getting bogged down in excessive due diligence, OTAs bring new defence innovations from the lab to manufacturing within 100 days, ensuring that Congress has no realistic opportunity to interfere. These \u201cnon-traditional methods of government procurement<\/em>\u201d are allegedly necessary because \u201cmission-critical technologies<\/em>\u201d need to be \u201cdelivered at a certain pace<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

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The public-private partnership accelerator, NSTXL, enables America’s \u201cmost creative innovators<\/em>\u201d to bypass \u201coutdated processes<\/em>\u201d like public oversight, as it \u201chas the task of revolutionizing the government’s approach to procurement<\/em>.\u201d NSXTL empowers private sector companies to \u201csolve the nation’s biggest challenges<\/em>\u201d by building a \u201cgovernable community equipped for any mission<\/em>.\u201d Which is, of course, essential if one is serious about combating hybrid warfare.<\/p>\n

While the US and Israeli governments have adopted their own MCF-like strategies, the Chinese government is advancing its transformative political agenda through the adoption of five-year plans. In 2021, faced with an outwardly disgruntled US administration, Beijing dropped any official mention of its military-civilian fusion strategy from its plans, while still outlining in general terms how China should develop. It now uses more cautious language for English-speaking audiences \u2013 speaking of the \u201cintegration of existing systems and coordination of civilian and military efforts<\/em>\u201d instead of \u201cfusion<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the hybrid \u201csocietal\u201d MCF strategy continued unabated.<\/p>\n

The public funds \u2013 particularly in the form of substantial state subsidies \u2013 that the Xi administration has poured into China’s fusion civil-military technology development have drawn considerable criticism within China. Those segments of the Chinese population who adhere to an idealized vision of Maoism reportedly view Xi Jinping’s eager adoption of \u201ctechno-capitalist<\/em>\u201d concepts as a threat to Chinese identity.<\/p>\n

The best equivalent to the concept of \u201caccelerationism<\/em>\u201d in China is \u201cji\u0101s\u00f9zh\u01d4y\u00ec<\/em>.\u201d It expresses the belief that society is on the verge of collapse and that resistance would only prolong the suffering \u2013 and that, therefore, a certain degree of self-destruction is not necessarily bad. Consequently, some of Xi\u2019s modern-Maoist critics disparagingly refer to him as the \u201cchief accelerator<\/em>,\u201d even though they reject ji\u0101s\u00f9zh\u01d4y\u00ec<\/em> and want to preserve and protect what they consider traditional Chinese values.<\/p>\n

In an article for the geopolitical publication War on the Rocks<\/em>, Charles Sun described how China’s MCF strategy works in conjunction with the deregulation of special economic zones. Referring to the rise of the Chinese robotics company Unitree to an influential force in the global robotics industry, Sun wrote:<\/p>\n

\u201cChina’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology has designated Unitree as a \u2018Little Giant\u2019 enterprise at the national level under the Specialised, Refined, Differentiated, and Innovative Enterprises Program \u2013 a status that grants access to tax breaks, subsidised financing, and public procurement contracts. [\u2026\u2026.] The company’s own prospectus lists tax incentives totalling 75.9 million yuan (US$10.56 million) for the first nine months of 2025 alone \u2013 including a reduced corporate tax rate of 15 percent as a certified high-tech enterprise, special deductions for research and development expenditures, and value-added tax refunds. [\u2026….] Unitree operates in the Hangzhou High-Tech Zone, designated as a centre for civil-military cooperation, with the zone’s Development and Reform Bureau having the institutional mandate to coordinate civil-military cooperation planning and \u2018civilian participation in the military\u2019 projects throughout the district.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

In a Forbes<\/em> article on the same topic, Amir Husain explained how Unitree’s robotic quadruped vehicles were transformed by China’s MCF strategy. Chinese \u201cpublic sector<\/em>\u201d defence contractors took Unitree’s \u201cdiscreet, quiet, and all-terrain chassis<\/em>\u201d and upgraded it by equipping it with AI-driven sensors and either machine guns or anti-tank missile launchers. The missile-launched version, the PF-070 system, was unveiled for \u201cofficial\u201d global sale at the World Defense Show 2026 in Riyadh, just weeks before the seemingly unpredictable Israeli-American attack on Iran began.<\/p>\n

The Turkish arms manufacturer Roketsan had already unveiled its nearly identical KOZ system several months earlier, in July 2025. According to Western media, the timing suggests that Unitree and Chinese arms companies copied the KOZ system. Perhaps the Chinese PF-070 system is the result of industrial espionage. However, espionage seems hardly necessary, considering that Turkish arms manufacturers and NATO suppliers like Roketsan have been collaborating with Chinese manufacturers such as the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) since the mid-1990s.<\/p>\n

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Left: Roketsan KOZ manufactured in Turkey. Right: PF-070 manufactured in China.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In his contribution to War on the Rocks<\/em>, Sun observed that \u201cthe United States is falling behind in robotics and artificial intelligence<\/em>.\u201d He attributed this lag to the fact that \u201cChina has built a system that translates commercial success into military capability<\/em>.\u201d In other words, Sun put forward the same superficial argument as the Praxians \u2013 namely, that American technological innovation should be \u201caccelerated<\/em>\u201d to keep pace in the \u201cdeadly<\/em>\u201d race against China.<\/p>\n

However, Sun contradicted his implied \u201cdeadly race<\/em>\u201d by writing that the \u201cinvestors<\/em>\u201d in the Unitree startup \u201cSequoia China<\/em>\u201d \u2013 now renamed HSG \u2013 were among them. As we have just discussed, it is nonsensical to consider Sequoia China\/HSG as independent of Sequoia Capital. While the investors\u2019 identities are protected, meaning that \u2013 unless they admit it themselves \u2013 we can rarely prove which investors are investing where, it is fairly obvious that Praxian oligarchs are among Sequoia Capital\u2019s leading investors.<\/p>\n

Praxians invest in disruptive technologies through venture capital firms like Sequoia Capital. In this case, the technology is currently being manufactured in Chinese special economic zones \u2013 and apparently also in Turkey \u2013 as part of the MCF strategy and could hardly be more \u201cdisruptive\u201d.<\/p>\n

Returning to Amir Husain’s Forbes<\/em> article: He wrote about the growing global market for advanced, AI-controlled weapons like the PF-070:<\/p>\n

\u201cWestern commentaries tend to portray these developments as a race that someone will either win or lose.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Husain was right to question this portrayal. He apparently recognized that the depiction of cooperative, international trade in advanced weapons between the public and private sectors as a geopolitical race for dominance is nothing more than propaganda \u2013 NATO-sanctioned STRATCOM \u2013 that they want to feed us. Pointing out these contradictions doesn’t make anyone, including Husain, a \u201cnon-state actor<\/em>\u201d engaged in \u201chostile intelligence activities<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Despite their investment scam, evidence suggests that US venture capital firms affiliated with Praxian, such as Sequoia Capital, have invested in China’s MCF companies. Praxian has presented the outcome of these Chinese investments as the necessary proof that the US defence sector, in which they invest most heavily, is engaged in a military-technological \u201crace\u201d it must win.<\/p>\n

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An exhibitor at the Border Security Expo 2026 in the United States presents the slogan \u201cInnovate or Die\u201d in front of his products<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The Trump administration, effectively controlled by the Praxians, is deploying enormous public funds to win the sham race for civilian and military technologies with China. Beneficiaries of this generous public funding include both the Praxians and China’s de facto<\/em> oligarchy. Sequoia’s investment in the startup Unitree appears to be an example of how neo-reactionary accelerationists from within the Praxian system are exploiting evil \u201ccreative destruction\u201d.<\/p>\n

Husain added:<\/p>\n

\u201cThe more important question is what impact the increasing proliferation of inexpensive, precise, and autonomous ground weapons will have on the actual planning and execution of military operations. If any state actor with adequate funding can deploy hundreds of expendable missile delivery platforms instead of a handful of manned armoured vehicles, the logic of military deployment changes.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Even adequately funded private sector \u201cactors\u201d can afford to wage war due to these \u201ctechnological solutions<\/em>\u201d accelerated by MCF and SEZ. The new \u201clogic of military deployment<\/em>\u201d is not limited to land warfare with armoured vehicles. The way US forces have been used against Iran is now so illogical that it is virtually impossible to believe almost anything we are told about the \u201cwar\u201d with Iran. It is entirely appropriate to call this a SCAD (state crime against democracy).<\/p>\n

(to be continued<\/em>)<\/p>\n

Author: Iain Davis<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

yogaesoteric
\nJuly 24, 2026<\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Read the third part of the article The fake AI technology race with China China’s DeepSeek V4 AI model was recently released globally as an open-source project. Developers worldwide can now use DeepSeek V4 at a fraction of the cost of its main US competitors \u2013 Google’s DeepMind, OpenAI’s GPT-5.4, and Anthropic’s Claude 4.5. DeepSeek […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[829],"tags":[1516],"class_list":["post-241099","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-astonishing-disclosures-referring-to-the-freemasons-plans-3480-en","tag-article_of_the_week"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/yogaesoteric.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/241099","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/yogaesoteric.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/yogaesoteric.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yogaesoteric.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yogaesoteric.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=241099"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/yogaesoteric.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/241099\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":241126,"href":"https:\/\/yogaesoteric.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/241099\/revisions\/241126"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/yogaesoteric.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=241099"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yogaesoteric.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=241099"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yogaesoteric.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=241099"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}