The Armchair Rioters

The New Offender: Armchair Rioter

The legacy media coined terms like “armchair rioter” or “armchair thugs” to encapsulate their propagandist argument that virtual communication network user can cause civil unrest by posting content online.

Obviously, from every perspective, this is totally absurd. It is akin to the “underwater sky diver” or “rubber chisel.” It is nonsensical, self-contradictory and blatantly ridiculous. But for propagandists that doesn’t matter. All that matters is that they can create a narrative that will lead enough people to imagine the preposterous credible.

For example:

An armchair thug who stirred up racial hatred on TikTok is among dozens in court over their part in violent riots.”

Or:

Armchair rioter gets 20 months in jail for his Facebook posts.”

There is so much propaganda enmeshed in our perception of “the truth” that it is important to first differentiate between reasonable cause for a conviction—though often not the sentence—and those that are extremely concerning from a sociopolitical perspective.

Under UK legislation, the Serious Crimes Act 2007 defines how an expressed opinion or statement crosses the line and becomes illegal. If any of us say or write anything with the intention of “encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence” we have broken the law. This publication offence is relatively simple to establish and understand.

For example, if I published an article urging readers to burn down someone’s house then, obviously, I would have encouraged others to commit serious offences and would also have put the homeowner at increased risk of real, physical harm. Perhaps most of us can appreciate why this is considered socially unacceptable.

In common law jurisdictions, such as the UK, we have traditionally called such direct attempts to encourage criminality, through published material or the spoken word, “incitement.” The Serious Crimes Act 2007 effectively removed “incitement” from the statute books. Instead the notion of “encouraging or assisting a crime” was created.

The important difference between “incitement” and “encouragement” is that the common law crime of incitement required that the crime incited was actually committed. Under the 2007 Act, you can be found guilty of your intention to encourage a crime, whether or not the associated crime actually took place.

UK “law” moved away from clear identification of causation—between a crime and those said to have incited it—to the far more subjective judicial interpretation of encouragement. The courts now judge the accused’s “intent,” which means establishing what they “believed.” So-called “encouragement” is, in no small measure, a thought crime.

High-profile cases where “armchair rioters” were sentenced to jail were used by mass media to show the public that people can be convicted in the UK for expressing anti-establishment dissent online.

The purpose of all this apparent state and judicial mis’ and disinformation is to instil fear in the public. The clear intention is to convince people they have to be careful about what they say in order to “stay safe” from the alleged authority of the state, which currently cannot stop anyone from saying whatever they like.

To reiterate: until recently it was illegal to encourage crimes, especially violent crimes. It was not illegal to express a political opinion.

However, with the introduction of the Online Safety Act 2023, the UK state has signalled its intention to make political dissent effectively “illegal.”

The way we communicate and access information has undoubtedly been changed by our use of the internet and particularly by our use of virtual communication networks. This means the “reach” of government relied upon to control the flow of information has diminished by comparison.

If we accept the advice to “follow the money,” it is obvious that our attention has switched away from traditional TV, radio and print news media to online news, most commonly accessed through virtual communication networks. By measured advertising investment, virtual communication networks are now the largest channels for adspend by a considerable margin.

Consequently, governments around the world have found it increasingly difficult to control our access to information and, thereby, our opinions. United Nation (UN) member states consider this to be a major problem. The UN addresses this directly in its 2022 Information Mapping Report:

Access to quality information plays a critical role in public trust, democracy, peace and social cohesion. […] As information becomes more accessible, it also becomes more open to influences from non-traditional actors in the infosphere — in most contexts anyone can create and disseminate information. As a consequence, the traditional actors and gatekeepers of information and news — established media and government institutions — are struggling to compete with this new reality.”

As far as governments are concerned, the legacy media represent their “gatekeepers of information and news.” The state is “struggling to compete” precisely because “anyone can create and disseminate information.” The fact that we, the people, can now communicate and share ideas and information between ourselves online has been identified as a threat at the global, governmental level.

A major caveat to the narrative I have just outlined is that the internet and many of the major Big Tech firms that dominate it, wouldn’t exist in their current form were it not for the considerable development effort of governments and, most notably, the intelligence agencies. Perhaps the internet has spiralled out of the public-private state’s control. Though we might be wise to consider, by corralling all our communication onto digital platforms, the internet actually provides states with an unprecedented opportunity to surveil and censor us. It would be naive not to consider the possibility that the drive toward censorship we are currently witnessing, was always the intention.

The “non-traditional actors in the infosphere” comprise of the general public and the genuinely independent media, sometimes framed as the alternative or “alt-media.” While significant efforts have been made to centralise and control the so-called “alt media,” some truly independent journalism remains. Real independent media, as averse to the legacy media’s claims of “independence,” can be defined as:

“……. journalism that isn’t beholden to governments, corporations, and other outside influences. This allows for impartial reportage that helps people make informed decisions on important issues. This includes all types of media, whether television, radio, print, or digital. It also encompasses journalists who either work for an organization or have their own blog, publication, or website.”

The Child Protection OSA Sales Pitch

In order to regain information control, the UK government has enacted the Online Safety Act 2023 (OSA). The OSA was sold to the public with arguments that it was necessary to protect children from the online grooming of paedophiles and other alleged internet and virtual communication networks related risks.

Yet, the state’s and its judiciary’s efforts to protect children from these risks are negligible to nonexistent. Freedom of information based research—which the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty To Children (NSPCC) has undertaken annually over the last sixteen years—shows that in the UK there were nearly 87,000 reported sexual offences committed against children last year. Paedophile offending in the UK remains “close to record levels.”

Research from the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) found a significant increase in online paedophile activity in recent years. Of course, this provides a reason to take steps to tackle the problem. Yet, with regard to online child sexual offences, it is very hard to see how the OSA will achieve anything.

In 2014 Facebook launched its dark-web onion address portal, enabling users to access its virtual communication network platform using encrypted and anonymous protocols. Much harder for law enforcement to detect and intercept, this is the favoured internet access route for paedophiles.

Facebook (now Meta) set up its “onion” address the year after the UK and the US governments formed their 2013 joint “dark web task force” to supposedly stop paedophiles grooming children online. Yet, despite Facebook remaining popular with children, neither government has done anything to stop Meta from continuing to provide apparent protected paedophile access to its platform. The OSA certainly doesn’t address the issue.

It seems the judiciary couldn’t care less about protecting children either. While people have received lengthy custodial sentences—after pleading guilty to “encouraging” racial hatred—time and time again, paedophiles are treated far more leniently by the farcically named justice system.

For example, BBC news anchor and paedophile, Huw Edwards, paid for the very worst child rape videos and images. Edwards more than “encouraged” child rape, he actively facilitated child rape. He received a six-month—effective non-custodial—suspended sentence. District judge Paul Goldspring declined to issue a sexual harm prevention order against Edwards and expressed his concern for Edwards’ psychic health. Goldspring was worried that Edwards could be “at risk of harm from others.” Edward’s sickening crimes evidently did not provide any kind of rational “context” for his sentencing.

The Real Reason for the OSA

Rather than take steps that might actually reduce the risk to children, through the OSA, the government and the judiciary has instead turned to policing what ordinary citizens say and the information they share online. The OSA has created nine new offences. Of these, if freedom of speech and expression matters to us, offences defined under Section 179 and 181 are dictatorial.

Section 179 deals with so-called “false communication.” If you send a message containing information you know to be false and you intend the message to cause supposed “non-trivial psychological or physical harm to a likely audience,” under the OSA you are potentially guilty of an offence. If found guilty, you could be fined or imprisoned for up to six months.

Among the many problems with this legislation is that non-trivial “harm” is not defined. Much like the legislative move from “incitement” to “encouragement,” this introduces a subjective interpretation of people’s intentions or their beliefs to the judgement of their suspected communication offences. The OSA represents a further step toward creating thought crimes.

The UK state prosecutors—the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)—openly acknowledges the thought crime aspect and the lack of clarity:

Non-trivial psychological or physical harm is not defined […]. Prosecutors should be clear when making a charging decision about what the evidence is concerning the suspect’s intention and how what was intended was not trivial, and why. Note that there is no requirement that such harm should in fact be caused, only that it be intended.”

The new Section 179 OSA false communication offences aim to censor whatever the state considers to be fake news:

These new criminal offences will protect people from a wide range of abuse and harm online, including […] sending fake news that aims to cause non-trivial physical or psychological harm.”

The new offences are aimed squarely at the public posting information online and particularly information posted on virtual communication networks. Section 180 of the OSA exempts the legacy media, who are deemed to be “recognised” news publishers, and other authorised—licensed—broadcasters from compliance with the OSA.

For the purposes of the OSA a “recognised” news publisher in the UK is defined under Section 56 . The BBC is automatically exempt from the legislation.

It is possible that some of the larger, genuinely independent media outlets will be able to comply with Section 56. This will have the effect of centralising any remaining independent journalism. Small personal blogs, those using platforms such as Substack or other independent blogging platforms, will be subject to OSA censorship.

The legal scholar Ricki-Lee Gebrandt observed:

……. the [UK] Government exempted virtual communication companies from taking action against (i.e. removing, flagging, etc.) ‘recognised news publisher’ content, legislated and subsequently strengthened privileges for ‘recognised news publishers’ and undefined ‘journalistic content’ and exempted the press from taking steps to ensure below-the-line comments did not contain unlawful content that the OSA otherwise prohibited the public from publishing online.”

The OSA places an onus on virtual communication platforms and search engines to clearly state, in their terms of service, what content they will allow and what content they won’t. Services that do not enforce their content policies will be punished by a fine up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.

Unlawful content” is defined to include so-called “fake news” under the OSA. As Gebrandt observed, while the legacy media can share whatever fiction they choose, if the public comment on that fiction—perhaps by posting contradictory information—the virtual communication platforms are required to police our comments and posts but not those shared by the “gatekeepers of information and news.”

Section 181 of the OSA deals with “sending threatening communications.” Again, there is considerable scope for this to be applied subjectively. While conveying a threat of death or serious injury would appear to be relatively easy to establish in a court, it is less clear how an alleged threat of “serious financial loss” might be determined. It seems entirely possible, if not likely, that posting support for the BDS Movement (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions Movement, which works to end international support for Israel’s oppression of Palestinians and pressure Israel to comply with international law), for example, won’t be permitted.

In addition, you are potentially guilty of this offence not by virtue of sending any message directly to a person or group, but because someone “encountering” the message—on a virtual communication network for instance—might “fear” that whatever they perceive to be a threat could be carried out. A bad joke might see you prosecuted and imprisoned.

Ofcom has been appointed by the UK government as the OSA’s “independentregulator. Ofcom is “directly accountable” to UK Parliament, is funded by many of the media corporations it currently regulates, and is “sponsored” by the UK Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), among other government agencies and departments.

Ofcom board’s declared register of interests reveals that, of its forty-six members (spread between Ofcom’s executive, content and advisory boards), fourteen have either former or current professional or financial ties to the BBC and twenty-six are either currently or were formerly in government roles.

Ofcom is not “independent” from the government, nor from many of the state and corporate legacy media corporations it supposedly regulates. The Ofcom Code of Practice will determine which online content on virtual communication platforms and search engines will need to censor.

Section 44 of the OSA gives the government “powers of direction” over Ofcom’s Code of Practice. The UK government will effectively set Ofcom’s code based upon whatever it deems necessary to allegedly protect “national security, public safety, public health,” and the way foreign governments are reported or discussed online.

This means state and corporate owned legacy media outlets, such as the BBC, will be free to publish whatever they like on virtual communication networks and their content will be ranked by the search engines, no matter what. Furthermore, with control of the Ofcom code, the UK state will determine what information can or cannot be shared online and, through the OSA, prosecute people and journalists who don’t comply.

For example, BBC’s promoting of fake stories about nonexistent “far-right riots” in Leeds will not be considered “false communication.” Under the OSA, legacy media outlets will remain free to share fake news on virtual communication networks. Only the public will be censored and potentially prosecuted for “false communication.” In other words, potentially imprisoning people for spreading alleged “disinformation.”

The so-called far-right riots have been exploited as an opportunity to test the OSA’s intended capacity to police alleged “disinformation,” in order to protect the “gatekeepers of information and news.” So far, this has been an almost comical debacle. The problem the state faces is that it is trying to maintain two diametrically opposed positions.

On one hand it wants to maintain the illusion that we live in some sort of democracy, but on the other hand, that it can legitimately censor and effectively ignore the democratic ideal of freedom of expression. The self-contradictory position explains why the state has relied on propaganda to create the myth that it has justifiable authority. Nonetheless, the UK state remains undeterred in creating a thought police and a Ministry of Truth.

Author: Iain Davis

 

yogaesoteric
October 25, 2024

 

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