Toka: New technology can log into other people’s cameras and alter recordings without their knowledge

Surveillance cameras are considered particularly credible witnesses in court, during police investigations, and in the public eye. Images are meant to document what actually occurred. But a technology from the cyber company Toka calls precisely this trust into question: it is designed to detect and take over other people’s networked cameras and manipulate live and previously stored recordings.

Toka was founded in 2018 by, among others, former Israeli Prime Minister and Defence Minister Ehud Barak and Yaron Rosen, a former brigadier general and former head of the Israeli Defence Forces’ cyber staff. According to the company, it works exclusively with the U.S. military, intelligence agencies, homeland security and law enforcement agencies, and close allies.

An investigation by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, based on internal company documents, revealed the extent of the technical capabilities. According to the documents, Toka developed tools that could identify cameras in a specific area and then remotely take control of them. Access would not be limited to simply viewing the images; stored material, as well as video and audio, could also be altered. The documents also described the possibility of “masking” activities during covert operations. Particularly alarming is the claim that such manipulations could be carried out without leaving any forensically detectable traces.

This creates a problem that goes far beyond the familiar debate about mass surveillance. Until now, the central question has been: Who is allowed to observe us? With such technology, a much more dangerous question arises: Who can alter what the camera supposedly saw?

The difference is fundamental. Surveillance is an intrusion into privacy. The undetected manipulation of a recording, on the other hand, can alter the basis for how an event is later reconstructed. If historical recordings can indeed be altered without a trace, a person could theoretically disappear from a sequence, an action could be concealed, or a sequence of events could be portrayed differently. There is no evidence that Toka was used for such criminal manipulations. However, the technical possibility alone raises significant questions regarding the rule of law.

That is precisely why a human rights lawyer interviewed by Haaretz described the technology as “dystopian.” Video recordings are no longer used solely for monitoring public spaces. They play a decisive role in investigations, indictments, and verdicts, and can document both state misconduct and crimes committed by private persons.

Toka intends to make these capabilities explicitly available to government agencies. TechCrunch reported that the company wanted to expand its business with American authorities and was seeking employees with contacts and experience at the Pentagon and US security agencies. Toka told the publication that it sells its products exclusively to military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement agencies of the United States and close allies.

For intelligence agencies and the military, the benefits are obvious. Whoever can take over enemy cameras gains access to information without having to install their own sensors. Whoever can also influence what these cameras record possesses a powerful tool for covert operations. However, this is precisely where the problem begins: a technical capability doesn’t distinguish between legitimate use and its misuse.

It’s also noteworthy who is funding Toka. Among the investors is Andreessen Horowitz, one of Silicon Valley’s most influential venture capital firms. This same investor is behind Flock Safety, whose automated license plate cameras are now used by thousands of American police departments. Andreessen Horowitz led a $275 million funding round for Flock in 2025, valuing the company at $7.5 billion.

There is no public evidence of a technical collaboration between Flock and Toka. Nevertheless, their investment strategy reveals the direction in which the security market is heading: networked cameras, automated data collection, artificial intelligence, and offensive cyber technology are growing into a multi-billion-dollar business sector.

The real danger, therefore, does not lie with a single company. It arises from an infrastructure in which more and more cameras are networked together, while at the same time tools are being developed that can remotely take over such systems. The larger this network becomes, the more crucial the question of the immutability of its data becomes.

A camera has particular value as evidence only because we assume that its recording was made independently of any later viewer. As soon as this assumption is no longer self-evident, the statement “There’s a video of it” loses some of its previous meaning.

Bret Weinstein succinctly summarizes the potential consequences: He warns of a world in which powerful actors could commit crimes while a technical service subsequently erases the digital traces. So far, there is no evidence for such a scenario. But the underlying concern is justified: Technologies that not only enable surveillance but also potentially manipulate its recordings require particularly stringent technical and legal controls.

yogaesoteric
September 15, 2026