States have learned from covid – surveillance and control are already in place for the next crisis
The years of the pandemic were not just a health crisis. They were also a large-scale test of how states, authorities, platforms, and media can handle unwanted information. What seemed somewhat improvised back then is now much more organized, institutionalized, and technically prepared.

New internal documents from the US reveal how far this trend had already progressed during the pandemic. In the office of then-US Surgeon General Vivek Murthy, a dedicated “Misinformation Tiger Team” existed, which, according to internal papers, was preparing a campaign with “maximum pressure” on major technology companies. The goal was to compel platforms to restrict certain health information more severely. Even more remarkable: As early as 2021, there were internal discussions about extending these structures not only to covid-19, but to “health and medical misinformation” in general.
For at least parts of the state apparatus, the coronavirus pandemic was therefore not just a one-off exceptional situation. The mechanisms that had been established were to be used further.
Structures were also created in Europe during the pandemic that now extend far beyond covid-19. The European Commission operated its own covid-19 disinformation monitoring program, in which platforms had to regularly report on how they downgraded or removed content, made “authoritative sources” more visible, and took action against information classified as false or misleading. The Commission later described the program itself as a kind of stress test for the European Code of Practice against Disinformation.
What was partly voluntary cooperation between governments and platforms during the corona pandemic has now become more formalized.
The Digital Services Act, for example, now provides for so-called Trusted Flaggers. These bodies, recognized by national authorities, report content they deem illegal; platforms are then required to prioritize such reports. While platforms formally retain the right to decide on content removal, the infrastructure for privileged reporting and rapid processing of problematic content is now firmly enshrined in European law.
Germany is going even further. The federal government openly states that state agencies monitor and analyse online disinformation campaigns. The Interior Ministry is leading the effort, with the participation of security authorities, state and local governments, and civil society actors. In June 2026, the Joint Centre for Combating Hybrid Threats was also opened, tasked, among others, with identifying and combating disinformation. The federal government explicitly mentions its cooperation with the EU, NATO, and international partners.
Switzerland is also developing similar structures. The Federal Council decided as early as 2024 to strengthen analysis and coordination in the area of disinformation and manipulation activities. An interdepartmental working group now exists, tasked with creating a situational overview, coordinating national and international cooperation, and proposing measures for prevention or countermeasures as needed.
All these measures are officially justified as protection against manipulation, foreign influence and dangerous misinformation.
But this is precisely where the problem lies.
During a severe crisis, it’s not some abstract entity that decides what constitutes “disinformation.” It’s governments, authorities, platforms, their recognized reporting centres, and institutional partners. And the years of the pandemic have shown that scientific assessments can change and that statements deemed false, dangerous, or undesirable at one point in time may later require re-evaluation.
The crucial lesson from covid therefore appears to have been not only medical in nature.
States have learned how quickly information spaces can be monitored. They have learned how platforms can be subjected to political and regulatory pressure. They have created reporting structures, institutionalized cooperation, and passed laws that permanently enshrine these processes.
For the next pandemic, much of this wouldn’t need to be built from scratch.
It already exists.
Of course, this doesn’t automatically mean that every dissenting opinion will be censored during the next health crisis. There’s no evidence for that. But the technical, regulatory, and institutional infrastructure that can be used to monitor, prioritize, downgrade, or remove information is significantly more advanced today than it was at the beginning of 2020.
But who will control those who decide which information is permissible, dangerous, or undesirable in the next state of emergency?
Because if the same institutions that decide on political measures also have a say in which criticism of these measures is treated as “disinformation”, a power problem arises.
Covid has shown how quickly societies accept extraordinary interventions under the pressure of a crisis. Since then, many of the structures implemented at that time have not been dismantled.
They were further developed.
yogaesoteric
November 17, 2026