Why the West is replacing its white population

The “Great Replacement” is now virtually a done deal

My thesis is that the large-scale demographic exchange of the white European population is the logical and almost inevitable result of the fusion between liberal universalism, which delegitimizes ethnic particularism and prohibits state favouritism of one culture over diversity and value pluralism, and post-Fordist capitalist optimization, which demands flexible, low-cost, and compliant non-Western labour, expanding global markets, and short- to medium-term profits. Together, these two mutually reinforcing logics have created a dynamic, high-level equilibrium and a path-dependent civilizational trap that, while quite effectively delivering GDP growth, systematically undermines the long-term demographic and cultural foundations of European societies.

The two logics: Liberal progressivism and capitalist optimization

Liberalism strives for a political and public sphere founded on universal principles that apply equally to all people, regardless of ethnicity, sexual identity, cultural background, or other ascriptive characteristics. Its fundamental commitment is to expand and uphold equal rights, based on the supreme moral principle that every person possesses the inalienable freedom to choose their own values, beliefs, religious affiliations (or lack thereof), and personal identity. The role of government should be to protect and expand these rights, rather than imposing a particular notion of the good life, a preferred lifestyle, or a specific metaphysical conception. Liberalism allows diverse persons to pursue conflicting conceptions of the good within a framework of mutual tolerance and respect. This requires universalist (or impartial/neutral) principles and institutions, such as the rule of law, meritocratic careers, and voluntary civic associations.

Although liberal principles are formulated to apply to people as such, the underlying psychology that makes this liberal order function is itself culturally developed and historically unique to European peoples. This ideology is not rooted in the discovery by scientists of species-wide natural predispositions in humans. All human societies, including pre-liberal Western societies, were based on particularistic, kinship-based ethics (in which relatives are treated differently than outsiders). A liberal environment, therefore, as Joseph Henrich puts it, presupposes a population with a “strange” psychology – that is, one geared toward impersonal trust and cooperation with strangers, toward abstract analytical thinking rather than “prejudiced” thinking within one’s own group, toward identification with self-chosen groups rather than kinship or ethnic ties, and toward a universalistic moral worldview that evaluates individuals according to their qualities and intentions rather than their inherited group affiliation.

Contrary to the widespread belief that liberalism is a purely “relativistic” or “neutral” ideology that does not aim to impose a particular way of life, this ideology is culturally and morally committed to the dissemination of liberal values. Precisely because it places the autonomous person and universal rights above all inherited constraints, it inevitably conflicts with traditionalist orders rooted in ethnic identities, patriarchal norms, kinship obligations, or any worldview that restricts personal choices in the name of collective customs or hierarchies.

In other words, liberalism contains an inherent progressive dynamic in its endeavour to “liberate” the public sphere from what it considers “backward” customs, discriminatory policies, or inherited status hierarchies. It even aims to liberate people from any personal prejudices (xenophobic, sexist, homophobic) they may harbour. It educates citizens to be tolerant, and value-pluralistic, while marginalizing or relegating to the private sphere those perspectives, such as ethnic nationalism or cultural traditionalism, deemed incompatible with equality. In practice, this means that liberalism works progressively to dismantle ethnic preferences, cultural ties to one’s own group, and gender differences in public life, replacing them with a regime of pluralism regarding race, culture, and lifestyle.

Capitalism, on the other hand, appears to be genuinely instrumental and value-neutral. Its logic is that of relentless optimization: the most efficient combination of inputs to achieve the highest returns under competitive and technological pressure. Markets, contracts, and meritocracy presuppose the same underlying, seemingly neutralized psychology as liberalism: a high degree of impersonal trust, an analytical evaluation of people based on ability and effort rather than origin or loyalty, and a willingness to conduct business with strangers according to abstract, universal rules. Labour, capital, and consumers are treated as interchangeable units in the calculation of costs, innovation, and market expansion. There is no inherent preference in capitalism for particular peoples, cultures, or long-term civilizational outcomes. What matters is simply the short- to medium-term necessity of reducing transaction costs, expanding the consumer base, and removing any barriers to growth.

Precisely because capitalism optimizes through impersonal exchange, merit-based selection, and continuous innovation, it exhibits a strong elective affinity with liberal institutions and leads to progressive outcomes, even if its motive is never ethical but purely calculative. By favouring personal talent over kinship or ethnic loyalties, relying on universal rules rather than in-group favouritism, and systematically eliminating customs, beliefs, or institutions that increase costs or impede mobility, capitalism selects and reinforces the non-tribal, universalist psychology that liberalism advocates. Capitalism as such does not seek moral emancipation or the expansion of human freedom; it merely requires the social and psychological conditions that allow calculative rationality to flourish on an ever-larger scale. In this sense, the two logics of liberal progressivism and capitalist optimization, while distinct, are mutually reinforcing.

The crisis of Fordism and the transition to post-Fordism and limbic multicultural capitalism

The displacement of whites cannot be understood without properly grasping the mutually reinforcing logics of liberalism and capitalism, as well as the transition from a Fordist to a post-Fordist liberal-capitalist regime. During the Fordist phase of capitalist accumulation (roughly the 1940s–1970s), the two logics operated in ways that greatly benefited the native white population of the West. Fordism was a regime of mass production of standardized goods for national markets, supported by high union-negotiated wages (including the “male family wage”), strong unions, government investment, and Keynesian economic policies aimed at balancing supply and demand. Within this accumulation regime, the progressive logic of liberalism brought widespread prosperity to whites: expanding social safety nets, better access to relatively inexpensive higher education, high rates of homeownership, and stable, family-oriented communities.

This Fordist, liberal capitalist order did not require labour from large-scale immigration. The postwar baby boomer generation, with its large families and good incomes, constituted a sufficient working class and consumer base within relatively homogeneous nations. This order fostered national cohesion, cultural identity, and widespread social mobility, while simultaneously supporting large public infrastructure projects such as highways, schools, and universities. During this period, as the progressive logic of liberalism unfolded, Western societies were still governed by certain “pre-liberal” norms: the belief that a family consists of a father and mother with children, that premarital sex should be avoided, that marriage is inviolable and divorce to be avoided, that the man is primarily responsible for the family’s support, that Western societies are Christian or based on Christian values and European ancestry, and that they show a certain degree of deference and loyalty to established hierarchies, institutions, and governments.

An American working-class family, 1971, shortly before the crisis of Fordism reached its peak.

However, by the early 1970s, the Fordist model began to crumble. Birth rates were declining sharply, domestic markets were saturated, and Western economies faced stagflation, decreasing profitability, and intensifying global competition from industrializing Asian countries that could produce goods at far lower labour costs. Excessive union activism and rigid labour structures further undermined the competitiveness of Western companies. Parallel to this structural crisis, multiculturalism began to take hold in the West. The liberal capitalist West adapted by transitioning to a post-Fordist multicultural regime (from around the 1980s onward). This new regime was optimized for uprooted, atomized populations, supported more by flexible, immigrant labour than by stable, native white families.

During the post-Fordist era, the progressive logic of liberalism ultimately undermined these remaining pre-liberal norms. In an increasingly flexible, service-oriented, and globally competitive economy, the remaining ties to traditional family structures, Christian-influenced morality, ethnic cohesion, and respect for established hierarchies were increasingly seen as obstacles to individual autonomy, labour mobility, and cultural openness. The universalist drive of liberalism thus evolved from economic redistribution and class-based fairness to a cultural politics of identity, diversity, and the active dismantling of “oppressive” traditional norms, which initially manifested itself in the 1980s and 1990s as political correctness and later as “woke” ideology. This cultural shift provided the ideological justification and social discipline required for post-Fordist accumulation by promoting fluid personal identities, celebrating diversity as an inherently good aspect, and pathologizing any remaining ethnic, sexual, or cultural particularism as bigotry, thereby aligning the public sphere with the demands of interchangeable labour, global markets, and constant optimization.

Western companies sought cheaper inputs, greater flexibility, and access to new markets by building global supply chains, outsourcing production, and shifting to flexible accumulation. Businesses moved away from rigid, unionized 9-to-5 work arrangements toward part-time, temporary, and contract work, including decentralized production using just-in-time techniques and subcontracting. In the 1990s, the economic shift from manufacturing to services, finance, and high-tech industries intensified, leading to the dominance of financial capitalism, where profits increasingly derive from trading assets, debt, and speculation rather than from physical production. This was accompanied by a heavy reliance on information technology, automation, microelectronics, and digital tools.

The introduction of multiculturalism throughout the West was not a product of “cultural Marxists” who had seized control of the public sphere, but rather the direct institutional expression of the progressive-pluralist logic of liberalism. Its central ideal is that the state, just as it should not impose religious beliefs on its citizens, should not prescribe a dominant culture, but should merely guarantee a public space in which people from diverse backgrounds enjoy equal rights to express their preferred values with mutual respect. The intended goal is not to promote group-oriented non-Western cultures, but to overcome past discrimination against non-Western or non-white populations by creating a level playing field or greater (compensatory) opportunities for minorities.

The consolidation of liberal multiculturalism, the obsession with overcoming past “racism” and “xenophobia,” provided the perfect ideological justification for the demands of post-Fordist accumulation. As birth rates among the native population declined and the European population was increasingly viewed as a costly and inflexible labour force, companies welcomed mass immigration from Third World countries with high birth rates. Immigration was thus presented both as an economic solution to the crisis of Fordism and as a new phase on the path to realizing progressive ideals.

Parallel to this post-Fordist system emerged what David Courtwright calls “limbic capitalism.” In his 2019 book, The Age of Addiction, Courtwright describes this as a technologically advanced business model in which global industries deliberately target the brain’s limbic system, responsible for pleasure, cravings, and rapid emotional responses, rather than appealing to rational decision-making. The goal is “addiction by design”: the development of products and experiences that trigger rapid dopamine releases and compulsive cravings without offering lasting satisfaction. Companies discovered that virtual communication networks, streaming platforms, video games, online shopping, pornography, delivery apps, and highly processed foods can be optimized for perpetual engagement through endless scrolling, personalized feeds, variable rewards, autoplay, and impulsive purchasing.

This form of capitalism favours overcrowded, uprooted megacities filled with atomized, homeless, indebted consumers and addicted people (whether immigrants or native whites) living in high-rent apartments, endlessly chasing the next dopamine hit. It thrives in overcrowded urban environments with endless streams of new consumers, flexible, cheap labour, and social or racial tensions that justify further state and corporate control. White, frugal families raising their children in suburbs or communities with strong cultural roots, family ties, and homes that can be passed down to the next generation are far less useful and therefore less desirable. Such families typically demand a higher standard of living, stable neighbourhoods, respect for cultural heritage, and green cities free from excessive commercialism.

Why post-Fordist capitalism favours Asian workers

Capitalism will strive for optimization in any political environment in which it is allowed to operate. This might lead some to assume that it has no inherent ethnic preference. However, there is no doubt that liberal capitalism in the post-Fordist era has shown a clear preference for both diversity and certain cognitive and personality traits that are statistically more common among East Asians (particularly ethnic Chinese) and Indians. I am not thinking only of its apparent preference for cheaper labour from the non-Western world. In the so-called major immigrant nations – Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States – it has also shown a preference for highly skilled, high-tech professionals who are more “goal-oriented” in their motivations; they are more focused on pure careerism, repetitive technical tasks, strict adherence to rules, and exhibit relatively few political leanings or intellectual and cultural interests outside their field and job requirements.

It views East Asians as exceptionally efficient (“frictionless inputs”) for post-Fordist technical tasks such as programming, algorithm design, lab work, and incremental optimization. White populations tend to be seen as less efficient in this narrow sense, due to their greater personality diversity, broader interests, higher openness to experience, and stronger propensity for political, philosophical, and social engagement. While these white characteristics have historically been crucial for revolutionary scientific breakthroughs, major innovations, and large-scale social projects, they are less optimal for the narrow, high-volume, high-conformity demands of today’s highly specialized, post-Fordist AI economy. Liberal capitalism is currently selecting for traits that optimize short- to medium-term economic returns at the expense of the West’s long-term civilizational creativity and cultural survival.

Some may rightly ask, however, how a nation as chaotic and dirty as India can produce highly skilled, high-tech migrants. Claims that Indians are being imported as a “bioweapon” to destroy the genetic makeup of Western nations misunderstand the fundamental dynamics of Indian immigration in the post-Fordist era. The immigration of skilled Indians is driven not only by the multicultural logic of liberalism but also by the capitalist pursuit of maximizing economic returns; markets tend to focus on the highest yields and the most cost-effective inputs for growth. India’s enormous population, for starters, provides a vast pool of technically skilled workers ideally suited to the needs of our modern economy. The country produces roughly 2.5–2.6 million STEM graduates annually. By contrast, the total number of STEM graduates with a bachelor’s degree or higher in Canada is only about 60,000–120,000 per year. Because equivalent skilled workers in India typically command salaries at one-third to one-fifth of Canadian or American levels, companies view them as an excellent reservoir of cheap but skilled labour without the higher wage demands or the familial and community baggage that native workers typically bring with them. Indians, in fact, dominate the pathways to highly skilled visas, accounting for roughly 70–72% of H-1B visas in the United States. They also occupy a disproportionate share (often 30–50% or more) of engineering and technical positions at major technology companies such as Amazon, Meta, and Google. In Canada, immigrants (among whom Indians are particularly numerous) make up 35% of computer programmers, 43% of engineers, and 55% of software developers and designers.

Second, Indian migrants are particularly attractive because they are more adaptable and geographically mobile than native whites with comparable education. Lacking deep community roots or established family ties in the West, they are more likely to accept irregular and intensive working hours. Recruiting new Indian migrants doesn’t come with entrenched mortgages, local schools, or union affiliations. This results in less political or social resistance when companies adapt to new market signals or replace human workers with AI. The cost savings are substantial: companies can hire a skilled Indian developer in the US or Canada on a work visa for $30,000 to $50,000 a year, compared to $150,000 to $200,000 for a similarly skilled American worker. Their narrowly focused education, complete focus on STEM subjects, their conformity, and their one-dimensional drive for money have made Indians extremely useful employees in limbic capitalist sectors such as social media, e-commerce, gaming, streaming, and AI-driven customer engagement.

The socioeconomic success of Chinese and Indians reflects this selection. In the United States, the median income of households with an Indian head of household, according to data from the Pew Research Centre (published in 2025), is roughly $145,000 to $156,000, significantly higher than the national US median of $75,000 to $83,000. The median income of Taiwanese Americans is $133,000 to $145,000, while that of Chinese Americans is $98,400 to $108,600. Chinese and Indian immigrants also tend to have higher levels of education in STEM fields. This should come as no surprise: Indian and Chinese immigrants to the US are heavily filtered through H-1B visas, which translates into employment. They do not “waste their time” on the humanities, but instead focus on high-paying fields such as computer science, medicine, engineering, and finance. In Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, second-generation Chinese and South Asian immigrants also have higher median household incomes and a stronger representation in high-tech professions.

However, we need not to forget that the optimization logic of capitalism also requires cheap, flexible labour for services, retail, delivery services, and hospitality to keep consumer prices low and profits high. Interacting with this optimization, the universalist logic of liberalism portrays restrictions on the immigration of low-skilled people of colour as racist, while simultaneously celebrating diversity in public spaces. In Canada (particularly from 2021 to 2024), low-skilled workers constituted a very large portion of the massive post-covid-19 immigration surge under Justin Trudeau. Their numbers far exceeded the influx of highly skilled, tech-savvy workers. These immigrants provide a reliable workforce for irregular shifts and jobs that are demanding in terms of hours and location. These are the Indians we see everywhere, fuelling complaints about driving habits, littering in public spaces, queueing etiquette, noise levels, large families in small apartments, and so on. For the post-Fordist regime, however, these are relatively minor inconveniences compared to the optimized yields and the creation of an ethnically “vibrant” reality.

The two driving forces: Capitalist optimization and liberal universalism in action

The main driving forces behind European immigration policy are the overt, structural imperatives of the post-Fordist liberal-capitalist system itself. Although these two forces have their own logic, they interact and reinforce each other. Let’s start with the capitalist side: We have Europe’s largest and most influential employers’ organization, BusinessEurope, which represents 42 national business associations and explicitly states that “labour mobility and skilled migration are essential for economic growth” and that companies need “favourable conditions for talent from outside the EU” to address labour shortages and maintain competitiveness. They explicitly argue that migration should be driven by business needs. They have an entire page on “Diversity and Equal Opportunities,” where they explain: “Promoting diversity and equal opportunities strengthens jobs and boosts economic performance.”

Many other business associations in Europe hold similar positions: the Italian Confindustria (led by Emanuele Orsini), the German BDI (led by figures such as Siegfried Russwurm and Peter Leibinger), the French MEDEF, and the Irish IBEC. These European-led organizations all strongly advocate for expanding legal migration. They represent tens of thousands of European companies in manufacturing, construction, agriculture, hospitality, tourism, and elderly care – sectors struggling with chronic labour shortages because there are either not enough local workers or they are unwilling to accept the low wages, working conditions, and seasonal nature of the jobs.

Similarly, the French MEDEF (Mouvement des Entreprises de France) is explicitly in favour of immigration. In 2023, MEDEF President Patrick Martin stated that France would need 3.9 million foreign workers by 2050 to address labour shortages in construction, healthcare, hospitality, and manufacturing overall. Ireland’s largest and most influential employers’ organization, the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC), consistently makes the same argument. The American Chamber of Commerce Ireland, in a publication entitled “Ireland’s Immigration Pathways – Driving Competitiveness and Economic Growth,” categorically argues that “it is vital for Ireland’s continued growth and competitiveness that Irish-based companies have access to the best international talent.” In 2024–2025, Confindustria in Meloni’s Italy welcomed an increase in legal work visas for 450,000–500,000 migrants over several years.

The progressive logic of liberalism, in turn, provides the universalist and moral principles that demand a diverse Europe in which the ethnic divisions and xenophobia of the past are overcome. Through a well-organized “humanitarian-industrial complex” of NGOs, churches, human rights groups, and progressive foundations, liberalism actively promotes, legitimizes, and accelerates the replacement of immigration with other forms of migrants. SOS Méditerranée, Sea-Watch, Proactiva Open Arms, and Doctors Without Borders (MSF) operate large rescue ships (Ocean Viking, Sea-Watch 3/4, Open Arms). Since 2014–2015, they have carried out thousands of operations and brought hundreds of thousands of migrants to European ports (mainly Italy, Spain, and Greece).

Other large humanitarian and religious NGOs, such as Caritas (Catholic), the Jesuit Refugee Service, and Oxfam, offer legal assistance, reception services, and advocacy within Europe and consistently campaign for expanded legal pathways for immigration, family reunification, and against any “externalization agreements” (EU-Libya, EU-Tunisia, EU-Egypt). The Immigrant Council of Ireland, one of many similar groups in Ireland, actively campaigns for broader legal rights for immigrants. The theme of the Council’s 7th Annual National Integration Conference, scheduled for June 2026, is “Vision for the Future: Building a Common Home in Ireland” and offers “a wide range of panel discussions, workshops, and talks on the challenges and opportunities of integrating migrants in Ireland.” The Open Society Foundations (George Soros) have been one of the largest private funders of pro-immigration civil society in Europe for decades. They support NGOs, think tanks, and advocacy groups that heavily promote immigration.

These organizations discredit restrictions on non-Western immigration as racist, xenophobic, or violations of human dignity. They provide material resources to facilitate migration, as well as legal assistance, and lobby the European Commission, Parliament, and national governments through joint letters, reports, and media campaigns. In 2025, for example, over 40 NGOs signed open letters calling on the EU to end its cooperation with Libya and expand legal migration pathways. Operating in a liberal European world, these groups maintain close ties to mainstream media, academia, churches, and a wide range of educational and legal institutions, thereby reinforcing the prevailing liberal discourse that Europe has a moral obligation to accept people from the Global South.

This universalist logic was recently on full display when French President Emmanuel Macron declared that the epicentre of the French language is no longer on the banks of the Seine, but in the Congo Basin, noting that some 21% of Parisians are now immigrants. In this liberal view, French identity and language are detached from the historical French people and can thus be carried on by African migrants, as long as liberal values are formally adopted. This view is enshrined in Article 1 of the 1958 French Constitution, which clearly states: “France guarantees […….] the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion.” Throughout the West, culture and language are no longer rooted in blood or ethnicity, but in universal or “creed-based” values implemented by NGOs, mainstream media, academia, entertainment industry and so on.

Who benefits? Who loses? A structural flaw of the post-Fordist liberal-capitalist order

A comprehensive assessment of the gains and losses associated with the post-Fordist regime would exceed the scope of this article. It goes without saying that millions of immigrants have benefited; and civil servants and academics have been motivated (by diverse career opportunities) to maintain and expand this multicultural order. From an economic perspective, the crisis of Fordism has been overcome. Immigration has been a major driver of labour force expansion and overall economic growth. Canada’s nominal GDP has more than octupled from $275 billion in 1980 to over $2.2 trillion in recent years (in current US dollars). Similar patterns are evident throughout the West. In the United States, nominal GDP rose dramatically from about $2.8 trillion in 1980 to roughly $29-31 trillion by the mid-2020s, just as immigration increased.

In a capitalist economy focused on optimization, aggregate GDP growth, returns for investors, and the increasing wealth of large capital owners are the key measures of success. In the US, the wealth share of the top 1% rose significantly from around 23% in 1989 to almost 31% by 2024. In Canada, the share of market income held by the top 1% increased significantly from around 8% in the early 1980s to 13-14% in the mid-2000s (and has stabilized at around 10–12% in recent years). The top 10% saw their share of income increase by five percentage points between the 1970s and 2021. In the United Kingdom, nominal GDP grew from about $565 billion in 1980 to over $3.3 trillion in recent years, accompanied by a remarkable increase in the income share of the top 1% since the early 1980s.

The greatest costs were borne primarily by large segments of the native white population. These costs include a near-stagnant or declining real GDP per capita (despite strong GDP growth), stagnant or declining real median wages, skyrocketing housing costs, overcrowding of hospitals, schools, and infrastructure, traffic congestion, loss of farmland and green spaces, and massive increases in government social spending on immigrants. In Norway, for example, immigrants accounted for 56% of all social assistance recipients in 2024, even though they represented only about 17-21% of the population. Similar discrepancies exist in other Western countries. Furthermore, there is now well-documented empirical research that consistently demonstrates a negative correlation between higher ethnic diversity and key indicators of social cohesion, such as general social trust, civic engagement, and community cooperation.

All human societies throughout history, up to the rise of the modern West, relied on intense kinship structures (clans, kinship groups, and cousin marriage) that fostered norms such as loyalty to relatives and one’s own group, shame-based social control, and preferential treatment. In contrast, for complex historical reasons that we need not delve into here, Western peoples have dismantled their kinship networks in favour of civic or voluntary associations, creating urban communities, guilds, universities, and corporations that were relatively open to all, regardless of lineage. White people began to favour societies and institutions where the same rules applied to everyone, regardless of status or personal ties. They began to favour unbiased analytical thinking, guilt over shame, and the recognition of intentionality in moral judgment.

The millions of non-Western immigrants who stream into the West do not, for the most part, share these points of view. Most come from cultures where favouring one’s own ethnic group is the norm and the path to success. Nepotism is not frowned upon but seen as a natural obligation. Exploiting birthrights, promoting chain migration, creating ethnic enclaves and parallel economies for members of one’s own group, including preferential hiring within ethnic networks, are considered appropriate behaviour.

Contrary to the expectations of liberal multiculturalism theory, immigrants (even second- and third-generation immigrants) do not tend to adapt to the universalism of native whites or to “neutralize” their own ethnic particularism. Instead, they exploit the neutralized public sphere precisely because the host society has been conditioned to treat any assertion of their own ethnic interests as racist and morally unacceptable. They treat the multicultural liberal order as a resource that can be used to advance their kinship networks. Game theory describes this as “strategic free-riding.” In the words of Pierre van den Berghe (The Ethnic Phenomenon, 1981), we are witnessing adaptive kin selection: ethnic groups behave like extended kinship networks that favour members of the same ethnic group in competition for resources. This millennia-old human behaviour is now playing out in societies where whites have unilaterally deprived themselves of any adaptive kinship behaviour in order to defend themselves. A concrete example of this dynamic is a recent video of a Nigerian immigrant in Canada instructing her ethnic ingroup on how to obtain free food, free transport, free furniture, free education, free childcare, free dental care and other social benefits.

This asymmetrical manipulation of fairness and white trust continues among so-called “assimilated” immigrants, Western-born non-whites, and even elected officials operating within the liberal-democratic system. A prime example is the Racial Equity Plan published in April 2026 by New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani. A self-proclaimed democratic socialist in the mould of Bernie Sanders, Mamdani operates firmly within the progressive-liberal order. His plan portrays persistent inequalities in housing, education, and income as the result of “decades of discrimination” and “systemic racism.” It requires dozens of city departments to adopt a racial equity perspective and prioritize resources and outcomes for “Black and Brown” communities.

Mamdani’s approach is not “racial communism,” but a logical development of progressive liberalism. He redirects the classical liberal commitment to equality toward the levelling of group inequalities through state intervention. While classical liberalism (a white-founded ideology) forbids whites from pursuing their group interests as a people, progressive liberalism simultaneously demands remedial measures for non-whites. This creates a situation in which whites have unilaterally disarmed themselves (culturally, psychologically, and legally) while arming others to advance particularistic group demands under the banner of “corrective justice.”

Furthermore, the post-Fordist model commits a serious error by classifying native white workers as less efficient than imported Asian labour. By rewarding “Asian” traits such as obedient focus on repetitive tasks and a lack of interests outside one’s highly specialized role, it optimizes for short- to medium-term returns. Whites, with their greater personality diversity, openness to new ideas, willingness to experiment, and adventurous spirit, are better suited for long-term pioneering innovation and disruptive thinking – precisely the qualities that have built and sustained Western civilization. By devaluing these broader creative and civilizational strengths of whites, the regime prioritizes the immediate accumulation of wealth over long-term goals such as cultural continuity and a grand technological vision.

Ultimately, the true cost of the post-Fordist limbic fusion of capitalism with progressive liberalism is the creation of a system that is biologically and culturally incompatible with the long-term survival of European peoples in their homelands.

The path-dependent civilization trap of the West

The “Great Replacement” is now on a path-dependent course that is extremely difficult to reverse. Indeed, liberalism and capitalism have merged into a high-level dynamic equilibrium trap that, while highly effective at generating short-term economic growth, incentives and opportunities for advancement for the elite, systematically undermines the long-term demographic and cultural foundations of European societies.

We repeatedly witness the enormous financial burdens, the disproportionately high crime rates, the collapse of social trust, the exploding real estate prices, and the declining standard of living for native Europeans. Nevertheless, the diversity regime continues, indeed, is even being intensified. From the perspective of the native population of European descent, the whole situation appears profoundly irrational and self-destructive. So why does the system insist on continuing down the same path?

Because we’re trapped.

I am referring here to what the historian Mark Elvin termed the “high equilibrium trap” in late imperial China. Chinese society had become extremely efficient at feeding a vast population through sophisticated pre-industrial agriculture and institutions. But this very success held it captive. Labour was very cheap and plentiful, so there was little incentive to invent labour-saving machines. The system seemed “good enough,” so it remained stagnant, producing impressive overall output, but with stagnant per capita income and no breakthrough toward modern science and industrialization.

The trap the West finds itself in is different. It is dynamic and optimizing. The West is constantly innovating in technology, finance, consumer culture, and now AI. But this very dynamism is channelled by a liberal culture that makes reversing course increasingly difficult. Even if politicians secretly sense that the postwar promise of harmonious diversity and the overcoming of xenophobia has instead led to persistent racial tensions and populist backlash, it has become almost impossible to transform course. The system is now highly path-dependent.

How exactly does this trap work?

First, post-Fordist capitalism is about quarterly profits, GDP figures, the market value of financial and real assets, risk, expected returns, and cheap labour. The real costs – welfare dependency, sexual assault, cronyism, loss of trust – are spread across large segments of the population over long periods. It is primarily ordinary native citizens who pay the price. Those who currently benefit (corporations, politicians, academics, entertainers, NGOs, and people of colour) do not feel these costs directly, which is why they keep the system running.

Second, liberal universalism has elevated diversity and non-discrimination to the highest values. It is extremely difficult for someone to build a career or profession while openly advocating for remigration, racial realism, and white identity. Politicians would rather ignore the data than admit that culture and ethnicity matter, that many immigrant groups do not integrate well, that social trust is weakened, and that liberalism is therefore based on fundamentally flawed premises.

Third, entire industries and professions have been encouraged to support the status quo: diversity consultants, immigration lawyers, refugee organizations, corporate human resources departments, and large parts of the welfare state, including schools and universities. Politicians are praised for appearing compassionate, inclusive, and tolerant. Businesses receive lower wages and compliant workforces. NGOs and academics receive funding and moral prestige. Deviating from this course would require dismantling entire institutions, removing powerful figures, and ending the careers of millions who have invested heavily in the system.

Fourth, millions of non-Western immigrants and their children are already in the West, with full legal rights and rapidly growing political influence. A return migration would trigger enormous social, legal, and political crises, such as lawsuits, media frenzy, accusations of “ethnic cleansing,” civil unrest, and massive short-term economic disruption. Demographically, population turnover has reached a point where a future non-white majority has already been born.

It’s getting worse. The trap is now being exacerbated by the convergence of limbic capitalism and artificial intelligence. Limbic capitalism refers to companies that specifically target the “limbic” part of the brain, which is responsible for pleasure and addiction. This form of capitalism has indeed boomed with virtual communication networks, video games, online shopping, pornography, gambling, and highly processed foods. These products deliver quick dopamine hits that compulsively bind consumers to them in order to maximize profit. Meta, TikTok, YouTube, X, Netflix, Amazon, and countless developers of gaming and dating apps have built limbic companies worth trillions of dollars.

The combination of limbic capitalism and AI systems, whose capabilities are increasing exponentially, is a prime example. AI will not merely complement the existing system; it will make escaping this trap even more difficult than it already is. It will create a new world of consumption, entertainment, and social interaction that does not require a society built on high trust, but rather thrives on uprooted, unmarried, and childless people. This order will provide Western elites with powerful new tools to manage the dysfunctional consequences of diversity through ubiquitous surveillance, algorithmic social control, and sophisticated brainwashing. In this respect, the West will move toward a model similar to China’s, but without the ethnic cohesion and nationalist politics.

Only a profound restructuring of Western societies, more radical in scope than any previous transformation in our history, coupled with a deep cultural and psychological reorientation of European peoples away from universalist liberalism, offers a realistic hope for a way out.

Author: Ricardo Duchesne

 

yogaesoteric
May 29, 2026

 

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